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CHAPTER
The demand for animal prod-ucts and services is a power-ful economic force in society,
and multibillion-dollar industries
are organized around this demand.
These industries often face in-
creased costs by improving animal
welfare and are quick to use eco-
nomic arguments against proposed
welfare reforms (see sidebar on
page 169). These arguments, while
often specious, can influence con-
sumers, voters, and policy makers.
Citizens are less likely to support
animal welfare reforms they’ve been
told will double their shopping bill
or impoverish family farmers.
Animal welfare advocates cannot
respond to these economic argu-
ments with moral rhetoric alone.
Instead, non-governmental ob-
servers (NGOs) must challenge the
economic assumptions, calcula-
tions, and conclusions of animal in-
dustries and produce reliable eco-
nomic arguments of their own. To
do so they should understand some
basic economic principles, which
we review below, and, when possi-
ble, enlist the help of economists. 
The Economy
People often refer to “the econ-
omy” without much understanding
of its fundamentals. There are two
schools of economic study, macro-
economics and microeconomics.
Most often references to “the
economy” are related to macroeco-
nomic concerns: interest rates,
employment figures, trade bal-
ances, inflation levels, commodi-
ties prices, and other aggregate
measures of market behavior.
Macroeconomic figures are helpful
for making broad comparisons
between today’s “economy” and
that of earlier periods or the
economies of other countries/
regions/states. Those who study
microeconomics focus on the
behavior of, and interactions
among, individual consumers, pro-
ducers, and industries. 
Changes in the welfare of ani-
mals—whether the animals are the
products themselves (e.g., meat,
hunting trophies, fur coats) or
whether animals are used in
process or production (e.g., eggs,
dairy products, cosmetics testing,
circus entertainment)—are made
at the firm level in response to
changes in costs (supply side) or
consumer preferences (demand
side). As such, we focus here on
microeconomic principles.
In Figure 1, the economy is illus-
trated as two concentric circles. In
a market economy, there are two
markets: the factor market and the
product market. In the factor mar-
ket, households (or firms) that
own the factors of production sell
their labor, land, and capital to
firms that produce products in
exchange for wages, rent, and
interest. In the factor market,
households are the sellers, and the
companies are the buyers. 
In the product market, compa-
nies sell the products they have
produced to households that pay
money to purchase them. The
money flows in the opposite direc-
tion this time: people buy products
from firms that produce them. In
this way, money flows circularly—
creating an economic marketplace
where money goes from the produc-
ers to the workers in the form of
wages and back to the producers in
the form of payment for products. 
Consider the market for eggs. In
the factor market, an egg farmer
needs factors of production, in-
cluding land on which to build
structures and pens to house his
hens; the hens themselves; equip-
ment to collect, sort, clean, and
package the eggs; feed and medi-
cines to keep the hens alive; car-
tons and packaging; trucks to ship
the cartons; and employees to
assist with all aspects of produc-
tion. Having invested in these fac-
tors, the farmer produces eggs for
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sale to the public. In the product
market, when the eggs are sold,
the payments received by the egg
farmer go to pay for the costs asso-
ciated with producing the eggs.
The farmer pays wages to his
employees, rent to a property
owner (or bank, if there’s a mort-
gage), and interest on any loans
taken to purchase the equipment
or otherwise manage cash flow. 
The government’s role in these
markets is pervasive. Taxes are
taken or expressly relieved at
almost every juncture. The farmer
may be exempted from sales taxes
that would otherwise be levied on
his equipment purchases and also
may deduct business expenses
from annual income taxes, but he
pays taxes on wages paid to
employees and any profits earned
from the business. Households,
which pay taxes on other nonfood
goods, are expressly exempt from
sales taxes on eggs because of gov-
ernment policy. The farmer’s work-
ers pay taxes on their income
earned, and the banks, landlords,
and equipment makers also pay
taxes on any profits earned from
their business dealings with the
egg farmer. Finally, beyond the tax
effect, the farmer may be eligible
for various government programs
and subsidies that may further
alter his cost structure. We discuss
the role of government in creating
or eliminating distortions in mar-
kets through use of the tax system,
subsidies, or other policies later.
Supply and
Demand
The relative volume of products
and money that flows between
households and firms in the econ-
omy is driven by supply (availability
of specific goods) and demand
(desire for those goods). Each
product has its own market and
supply and demand characteris-
tics. Each firm in a given product
market has its own supply curve
driven by its cost structure—that
is, the firm can calculate for any
given price what quantity of goods
it can produce and still earn a rea-
sonable profit margin. Each con-
sumer in a given product market
has an individual demand curve:
each of us has a personal schedule
of prices we’re willing to pay for
various quantities of that good. 
In today’s complex product econ-
omy, few buyers and sellers meet
to negotiate specific terms. In-
stead, most products are sold in
stores alongside thousands of other
products, each with its own unique
market at play. As such, firms can-
not “price discriminate,” that is,
set a different price for every con-
sumer’s unique willingness to pay.
Even though you might be willing
to pay $2 for a bag of peanuts, and
one of the authors is only willing to
pay $1, the selling firm must select
a single price–one it hopes will
maximize its profits given our dif-
ferent preferences.
What becomes relevant then is
the overall supply and demand
schedules. Supply is measured as
the sum of individual firm supply
schedules, and demand is the sum
of individual household demand
schedules. The “market clearing”
price and quantity for the good are
set by the intersection of the will-
ingness of suppliers to supply and
consumers demand for the product.
This relationship is illustrated in
Figure 2. At any given price, the
firms in this product market are will-
ing to supply some quantity of a
good that is demanded by con-
sumers. The higher the price people
are willing to pay, the higher quan-
tity a firm will be willing to supply.
The converse is also true: if the will-
ingness to pay for a given product is
lower, firms will supply a lesser quan-
tity. The demand curve declines
because consumers are allocating
among scarce resources. At higher
prices for any given goods, fewer
consumers are willing or able to pur-
chase them. Conversely, as goods
become widely available at lower
prices, more people are willing or
able to purchase them. 
The market is said to “clear” at
equilibrium: supply and demand
intersect where the amount de-
manded equals the amount sup-
plied, at what’s called the “market
clearing” price. In Figure 2, given
Demand1, this happens at a quan-
tity of Q1 and a price of P1, the
product of which determines the
total revenue received by the firms.
The slope of the two curves 
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“elasticity” in the market. Elastic-
ity indicates the degree of flexibility
in buying or selling an item at
higher prices. On the demand side,
consumers may have relatively
inelastic demand for staples like
milk, flour, or eggs and for items
like gas for their car, prescription
medications, or cigarettes (if one is
a smoker). Because consumers of
these products tend to “need”
them, they are less sensitive to
prices—as prices go up, they may
purchase somewhat fewer goods,
but they will likely continue to pur-
chase them. A person has more
elastic demand for less necessary
(to them) goods. Luxury items or
“splurge” products may quickly
become off-limits if the price
increases. If the price of freshly
baked bread from the bakery rose
somewhat, for example, many con-
sumers would decide to switch to
processed bread from the bread
aisle. 
On the supply side, firms have
varying flexibility to respond to
price changes with contraction or
expansion of the number of goods
supplied. For some products they
may be able to expand supply rapidly
to take advantage of higher prices
in a market; for others, they might
have more limited ability to react.
Short- and long-term scenarios can
adjust the price elasticity of both
supply and demand over time, but
measuring elasticity plays a key role
in evaluating consumer and firm
responses to changes in the market
environment, including changing
information, cost structures, and
preferences relating to improving
animal welfare.
The characteristics and observa-
tions that drive supply and de-
mand curves can and do change in
reaction to endogenous (within
the market) and exogenous (be-
yond the market) factors. Endoge-
nous factors might be new ver-
sions of products or marketing
campaigns that alter supply or
demand or both. Exogenous fac-
tors can include new information
(e.g., independent research show-
ing ill health effects associated
with a given product), disasters
(natural, disease outbreaks, ter-
rorist attacks), or the introduc-
tion of competing products with
different (better) characteristics.
When changes like this occur, sup-
ply and demand can shift in or
out, causing a new equilibrium 
to manifest. In Figure 2 demand 
is shown to be shifting out; for
every given price of the good, a
higher quantity is demanded. Sup-
pliers, whose schedules did not
change, react by shifting their pro-
duction to the quantity Q2 and










P x Q = Revenue
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Economics in its application may
seem a cold and hard science: in
fact, it was famously deemed the
“dismal science” by Thomas Carlyle
in the mid-1800s. But at its most
basic level, economics is fundamen-
tally a study of what people value or
prefer, thus it has its roots in moral
philosophy. Whereas moral philoso-
phy concerns itself with what pref-
erences people ought to have, eco-
nomics concerns itself with what
preferences people actually have,
and how they can best be satisfied. 
People do not always express
their preferences, making meas-
urement difficult. Modern econom-
ics has sought to measure the pref-
erences revealed by individuals’
behaviors in markets, where goods
and services are exchanged using
money. For example, if one is will-
ing to spend $2 for a bag of
peanuts but only $1 for some pop-
corn, one is said to reveal a
stronger preference for peanuts
than for popcorn. More controver-
sially, money may also be used as a
common currency to compare the
preferences belonging to different
people. If one is willing to spend $2
on peanuts, but another is willing
to spend only $1 on peanuts, then
the first is considered to have a
stronger preference for peanuts
than the second has. (This is
imprecise, since $1 may have more
value for the second person than it
does for the first, if, for instance,
the second has a lower income.
But economists argue about how
such imprecision can be cor-
rected.) A market is considered to
be economically efficient when, on
the whole, society is able to maxi-
mize the satisfaction of its mem-
bers’ preferences.
Because nonhuman animals do
not participate in markets, within
an economic framework, their
preferences can be measured only
indirectly by the extent to which
human consumers value animal
welfare when making their eco-
nomic decisions. For instance, a
hen’s preference not to be caged
has market value only when a con-
sumer recognizes this preference,
feels some obligation to respect it,




A production process transforms
inputs into outputs. In the case of
animal production, inputs such as
animals, feed, housing, human
labor, and veterinary services are
transformed into outputs such as
meat, eggs, milk, fur, zoo amuse-
ments, and product testing assur-
ances. To maximize profits, animal
producers may attempt to maxi-
mize the efficiency of this transfor-
mation. The implications for ani-
mal welfare are illustrated in
Figure 3 (McInerney 2004). The
vertical axis indicates animal wel-
fare, while the horizontal axis indi-
cates the efficiency of animal pro-
duction in terms of some product
for human consumption, such as
eggs per unit of production cost.
Point A represents a completely
unmanaged, wild existence for ani-
mals. Arguably, there is some level
of management that increases wel-
fare above this level; for instance,
providing food, shelter, and protec-
tion from predators to otherwise
free-roaming animals. From the
animals’ perspective, the ideal
level of welfare is B. 
Beyond B, producers sacrifice
animal welfare for the sake of
increased productivity. This may
involve intensive confinement, to
decrease housing costs, and inten-
sive breeding, to increase produc-
tivity per animal. As more of an
animal’s metabolism is dedicated
to production, less is available to
support central determinants of
animal welfare, such as immune
function or cardiovascular and
skeletal health. Animal mortality
caused by intensification is eco-
nomically acceptable to producers,
so long as the gains in efficiency
outpace the increase in mortality.
If unregulated, producers moti-
vated solely by efficiency will oper-
ate at D. Beyond this point, ani-
mals begin to fall sick or die in
sufficiently large numbers that
total efficiency declines. 
Presumably to the left of D is a
point C, where the welfare of ani-
mals is socially optimal from
humans’ point of view. For reasons
discussed below, C is likely to be
much closer to B than it is to the
existing level of welfare provided by




A society’s attitudes toward animal
welfare could be revealed by con-
sumer demand for animal welfare-
friendly products. However, the
socially optimal level of animal wel-
fare may not be achieved through
the market because the market
suffers from a number of failures:
aspects of animal use and produc-
tion create “negative externali-
ties”; the “opportunity costs” of
animal use are rarely, if ever, fac-
tored in; the failure to consider
“substitution effects” for compet-
ing or alternative products; the
high and increasing market con-
centration of many animal-using
industries; animal welfare, which
has both public good and merit
good characteristics; and con-
sumers who are not well-informed
about animal welfare.  
Negative Externalities
A negative externality is a cost that
a product causes to society that is
not reflected in the product’s price.
For instance, a producer that
causes pollution in manufacturing
a product may cause a negative
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externality if neither the producer
nor the consumer is taxed to offset
the pollution abatement costs.
Externalities can be corrected by
some form of government action.
For instance, a government can
restrict or tax pollution or the sale
of polluting products. Left uncor-
rected, negative externalities push
adverse impacts onto people who
are not party to the production or
consumption of the product.
Poor animal welfare causes sev-
eral negative externalities. A num-
ber of consumers feel discomfort
about other people’s mistreatment
of animals. People who live or work
near concentrated animal-feeding
operations (or CAFOs, where ani-
mals are raised indoors in large
numbers at high densities), often
are adversely affected by the air
and water pollution generated. Not
only is their health compromised,
but often they find their property
values are depressed, owing to the
pollution caused by their CAFO
neighbors. Both the discomfort
and the pollution are negative
externalities, genuine social costs
that are not reflected in the mar-
ket prices of the animal products. 
Opportunity Costs
Justifications for animal use or
reduced animal welfare rarely take
“opportunity costs” into account.
The opportunity cost of any deci-
sion is what was forgone in favor
of what was selected. For example,
state government agencies with
purview over natural resources
often claim that providing new
hunting opportunities (e.g., new
species, new seasons, lower age
requirements, or increased bag lim-
its) provides economic benefits to
states. But these officials do not
factor in the reduced opportunities
for wildlife enjoyment that neces-
sarily result from more hunting.
According to the latest U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service national sur-
vey, wildlife watchers outnumber
hunters by a factor of five to one
and generate $38.4 billion per year
relative to hunters’ impact of $20.6
billion (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice 2002). The opportunity costs
of increased hunting, then, may be
reduced wildlife watching, which
brings with it an offsetting, unfac-
tored economic impact.
Substitution Effects
In characterizing the economic
impact of a proposed increase in
animal welfare, firms, trade associa-
tions, or government officials often
overlook the existence of “substitu-
tion effects.” Consumer demand for
a given good can and does change
in response to changes in prices,
laws, social mores, and the availabil-
ity of alternative products. When
the market contracts due to lower
consumer demand, the reduced rev-
enue in that product market does
not show the whole picture. Con-
sumers likely have shifted their pur-
chases to another substitute prod-
uct that is more desirable. To
measure the true impact of an in-
crease in animal welfare, these pur-
chases must be included. 
For example, local officials have
defended continuing circus shows
with exploitative animal acts in
publicly owned arenas because
such shows generate revenue for
the city and for proximate restau-
rants, parking garages, and the
like. But local officials rarely factor
in the economic impact that might
be generated by animal-free cir-
cuses or other children’s entertain-
ment that would substitute for the
animal events. In some cases the
substitution effect might be so
great that it might more than off-
set the loss of revenue from the cir-
cuses, especially in light of the
decreasing popularity of such
shows with the public. In the
absence of a traveling animal show,
more families might opt to take
advantage of local attractions that
hire residents as employees, in
contrast to the circus employees
who reboard the train or bus and
spend their incomes in other parts
of the country. What’s clear is that
failing to account for substitution
effects distorts the market and
potentially reduces opportunities
for increasing animal welfare. 
Increasing Market
Concentration
A truly competitive market is pos-
sible only when enough buyers and
sellers participate. When many
firms vie for the same consumers,
competition doesn’t just put down-
ward pressure on prices—which is
usually a good thing—but it also
creates pressure for individual
firms to react more quickly to
changing consumer preferences.
People are generally familiar with
the notion of monopoly: a single
firm produces a product, and no
other firms find it profitable to
enter the market (owing to patent
protection, scale economies, first-
mover advantages, or other fac-
tors). A monopoly allows a firm to
control the entire supply curve,
puts upward pressure on prices,
and tends to be slower at innova-
tion or product improvement
(hence, the characterization of the
“lazy monopolist”).
But a market doesn’t have to be
strictly monopolized by a single firm
to show signs of these failures. Mar-
kets with high levels of seller concen-
tration (that is, with very few sellers)
can significantly reduce their com-
petitiveness and be slow to respond
to changing consumer demands. 
Livestock markets are particu-
larly concentrated and increasingly
vertically integrated along the sup-
ply chain (i.e., where once farmers
sold to slaughterhouses, who sold
to packers, now one company owns
all three levels). Rapid expansion
of industrial farming has dramati-
cally reduced the number of meat,
dairy, and egg producers, turning
the family farm into a novelty. A
March 2005 USDA study of market
structure in the meat, poultry,
dairy, and grain-processing indus-
tries concluded that 
[T]he drop in the number of
plants, sharp rise in plant size,
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and a leveling or decline in the
per capita consumption of red
meat, fluid milk, and flour
products led to a 50 percent
increase in average four-firm
concentration levels—to about
46 percent for all nine indus-
tries.(Ollinger et al. 2005, iv)
On average, four companies
accounted for about half of the total
production in each of these indus-
tries. Perhaps the most notable ex-
ample of market concentration is
the hog industry. Between 1975 and
2005, the number of hog farmers 
in America fell from 660,000 to
67,300—nearly 90 percent (U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, National
Agricultural Statistics Service
[USDA/NASS] 2005). This is not
due to a decline in demand for pork
products. The number of pigs raised
on U.S. farms actually increased
over that same period—from 69
million pigs per year to 104 million
pigs per year (USDA/NASS 2006).
Four major companies control more
than 64.1 percent of the hog
slaughter and packing industry in
the United States (U.S. Congres-
sional Research Service 2006).
Even the National Pork Produc-
ers Council, the trade association
representing pork packers and pro-
ducers, told Congress that this
level of concentration raises issues:
While not a guarantee of con-
duct that increases consumer
prices and/or reduces pro-
ducer prices, these levels and
their trends increase the possi-
bility of such conduct and pro-
v ide  ample  incent i ve  for
heightened vigilance. (Caspers
2000, n.p.).
As of mid-2006, federal antitrust
officials were reviewing Smith-
field’s proposed acquisition of its
biggest rival, Premium Standard
Farms, which followed on Smith-
field’s acquisition of ConAgra’s
refrigerated meats subsidiaries
earlier in the year (Associated
Press 2006).
Public and Merit Goods
Animal welfare has characteristics
of both public goods and merit
goods. A public good is a good val-
ued by everyone in society, whose
benefit is nonexcludable (it can be
enjoyed by anyone) and non-rival
(one person enjoying it has no
effect on another enjoying it).
Clean air is an example of a public
good. When the air is clean, every-
one can enjoy it: one person’s
enjoyment has no ef fect  on
another’s. Wildlife is another exam-
ple of a public good. One person
admiring the neighborhood mourn-
ing doves does not diminish a
neighbor’s enjoyment from watch-
ing the same birds. In a free mar-
ket, producers have no incentive to
supply public goods in sufficient
quantities, since they cannot cap-
ture full payment. As a result, pub-
lic goods often must be provided—
or protected—by governments or
other collective bodies with the
power to regulate their use. Using
the mourning dove example, soci-
ety must decide whether or how to
balance the interests of those who
favor watching or feeding the birds
with the interests of those who
enjoy shooting them. 
A merit good is a good that is not
valued by everyone in society but
has broad social benefits. Public
schools and vaccinations are exam-
ples of merit goods. All members of
society indirectly benefit from pro-
vision of these goods, even if they
are not a direct consumer of them.
A merit good may be provided or
subsidized by governments if there
is sufficient public support for such
action. Alternatively, governments
may spend money increasing de-
mand for merit goods by educating
society about the good’s merits.
Animal welfare has aspects of
both public and merit goods. Some
level of animal welfare is a public
good: nearly everyone in society
believes animals should not be
starved or beaten, for instance. But
some level of animal welfare is a
merit good. While not everyone
believes that CAFOs are inhumane,
for example, those who do may be-
lieve it so strongly that aggregate
social welfare, as a whole, might be
increased by banning CAFOs. 
Imperfect Information
The market for animal welfare also
suffers from imperfect information.
Producers and retailers do not have
complete information about the
degree of consumer demand for
animal welfare; producers often
lack full information about the
costs associated with improving
animal welfare; and consumers are
not given (and often cannot
obtain) accurate information about
the animal welfare aspects of prod-
ucts they purchase.
Most consumers value animal
welfare but may know little about
how their purchases affect animals.
For instance, a recent poll found
that 71 percent of respondents
believe “in general, farm animals
are fairly treated in the United
States” (Zogby International 2003).
But when asked about standard
farming practices in the United
States, most of these same people
deemed them objectionable. A
2000 Zogby poll found that 86 per-
cent of adults feel the crowding of
hens in commercial egg production
is “unacceptable” (Yahoo News
2000). A 1995 poll by Opinion
Research Corporation found that
90 percent of respondents disap-
proved of the standard practices of
confining veal calves, pigs, and hens
(Swanson and Mench 2000). The
majority of Americans object to
standard agricultural practices—
but only after they’re told what
those practices are. This suggests
that Americans are largely ignorant
about factory farming, so their pur-
chases do not accurately reflect
their stated preferences. 
The problem is exacerbated by
the lack of transparency in animal
products. Animal welfare is a quality
characteristic of a product, an
aspect that consumers value and
use to differentiate competing
165
products. However, unlike some
characteristics—like taste, smell,
or touch—it can rarely be observed
in the final product. Consumers
cannot determine from an unla-
beled product how animals were
treated during production. As a
result animal products are consid-
ered “credence goods,” goods
whose characteristics (in this case,
animal welfare) cannot be dis-
cerned by a consumer before or
after purchase. 
Credence goods cause market
inefficiency, since consumers may
inadvertently buy lower-quality (in
terms of animal welfare) goods and,
therefore, drive higher-quality (in
terms of welfare) goods from the
market. The market failure sur-
rounding credence goods is justifica-
tion for government intervention,
typically in the form of standards
and labeling requirements. Some
labeling programs have sought to
provide information about animal
welfare, though these are often
found to be inadequate (at best) or
deceptive (at worst). More complete
and accurate labeling improves eco-
nomic efficiency by helping con-
sumers to target expenditures
toward products they most want. 
The use of animals in cosmetics
testing provides a good example of
improved labeling that has resulted
in a more efficient market where
consumers’ purchases can accu-
rately reflect their preferences.
There are a number of different
labels, each providing different lev-
els of assurances about the use of
animals (as testers or ingredients).
Some labels indicate that animals
were not tested for the finished
product (meaning the individual
ingredients themselves may have
been tested on animals), while
others assure not only no testing of
the finished product or ingredients
but also the absence of animals as
an ingredient. These labels give
consumers additional information
about cosmetics products, which
allows them to consider their pref-
erences when they shop.1
Last, it is worth noting a funda-
mental market failure: the largest
group of stakeholders in decisions
affecting animal welfare—the ani-
mals, themselves—do not partici-
pate in the market. Their prefer-
ences, and their suffering, are of
no direct account.
Willingness to Pay
A fundamental proposition in eco-
nomics is that the extent to which
society values a good is indicated by
the level of consumers’ willingness
to pay (WTP) for it. Some con-
sumers are not willing to pay much
for animal welfare, while others are
willing to pay a considerable
amount. From the perspective of
society, the optimal level of animal
welfare is that which corresponds to
society’s aggregate WTP. 
Many consumers willing to pay
considerable amounts for animal
welfare have no opportunity to do
so in the market. This includes
consumers who choose not to par-
ticipate in a market (for instance,
vegans); consumers who cannot
participate in the market because
the products they want to buy are
unavailable; and consumers who
participate, and are willing to pay
some amount for welfare improve-
ments, but not as much as what is
currently charged. 
Society’s revealed WTP for ani-
mal welfare, as embodied in mar-
ket behavior, may thus be signifi-
cantly lower than its actual WTP.
To capture the residual WTP, econ-
omists try to measure society’s
declared WTP by asking people
what they would be willing to pay
to see a specific improvement take
place, for instance, “How much
would you be willing to pay to see
a ban on whaling?” WTP research
typically involves the use of surveys
of a large sample to represent the
attitudes of society. 
Society’s aggregate WTP can be
derived from estimates of average
WTP multiplied by the total popu-
lation size. This number represents
the total benefit society receives
from an improvement in animal
welfare. If this number is greater
than the total cost of the improve-
ment, then the improvement is a
net benefit to society and should
be instituted.
Consumers report a willingness to
pay more for products labeled with
animal welfare assurances. In a 2004
poll, three-quarters of respondents
said they were willing to spend two
cents more for a fried-chicken meal
with welfare assurances (Zogby
International 2004). In fact, the
KFC Corporation (parent of Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken) has estimated
that meeting NGOs’ (nongovern-
mental observers) demands for wel-
fare improvements would increase
costs by less than this amount
(Blum 2004).
Other research suggests that
consumers are willing to pay an
average 17–60 percent more for
eggs from cage-free systems (HSUS
2006). One study found that con-
sumers were willing to pay average
taxes of $8 per person per year to
fund practices they believed would
improve conditions for hens (Ben-
nett and Larson 1996). This WTP
exceeds the additional cost of cage-
free production, as discussed in the
sidebar on page 170. 
Consumers’ statements do not
always translate into actual pur-
chases, as revealed by the low market
shares of non-CAFO products. The
misfit between consumers’ inten-
tions and their behavior might owe
to the unavailability of non-CAFO
products in many supermarkets and
restaurants; absent or poor labeling;
or perceptions that the responsibility
for animal welfare lies with govern-
ment, producers, or retailers (Bland-
ford et al. 2000). There are also con-
cerns about the accuracy of declared
WTP. People who feel strongly about
an issue could declare a WTP that is
unrealistically high. Therefore, a
number of research methods have
been devised to improve the accu-
racy of declarations. 
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Taking Account 
of Free Trade
Animal welfare legislation in Europe
and the states of Florida and Arizona
outlawed the use of particular ani-
mal production systems within their
national or state boundaries. How-
ever, both sets of legislation may
have a limited effect on animal wel-
fare as long as consumers continue
to demand, and are supplied with,
products imported from other
nations or states that use the out-
lawed systems. Trade thus repre-
sents a special problem for animal
welfare legislation. As the European
Commission noted, 
[A]nimal welfare standards,
notably those concerning farm
animal welfare, could be under-
mined if there is no way of
ensuring that agricultural and
food products produced to
domestic animal welfare stan-
dards are not simply replaced by
imports produced to lower stan-
dards. (European Commission
2000, 1) 
This concern applies just as readily
to interstate trade within the United
States.
As an example, the United King-
dom maintains higher animal wel-
fare standards for sows than do most
European Union (EU) countries.
Since the country’s ban on sow ges-
tation crates and tethers went into
effect in 1999, U.K. pork costs
increased and production volume
declined by 40 percent. In 2005
more than half of all pork products
in British supermarkets were im-
ported, and more than two-thirds of
these imports were produced using
systems illegal in the United King-
dom (Meat News 2005). 
In one survey, 92 percent of
British respondents believed im-
ported meat should be produced to
U.K. minimum standards (Meat
News 2005). Similarly, 95 percent
of respondents in an EU-wide sur-
vey said that imported products
should be produced under animal
welfare regulations at least as
demanding as those applied in
their own countries (Poultry World
2006). Trade restrictions are one
way to solve the problem, but inter-
national trade rules limit the kinds
of restrictions that are possible.
Rather than modify trade rules,
the most practical means of pro-
tecting animal welfare may be to
educate consumers and to con-
vince retailers to carry only accept-
able products. While trade agree-
ments can force nations to allow
imports, they can’t force supermar-
kets or restaurants to sell them: 
Retailers are becoming the
most potent force in setting
animal welfare standards and
will be the major engine for
influencing animal welfare
change. They can move faster
than governments, can cut off
a supplier’s livelihoods by stop-
ping contracts, and can ignore
international trade agree-
ments. While Europe as a
whole has to adhere to the
World Trade Organization and
cannot bar imports on animal
welfare grounds, retailers are
free to do so. (Bayvel 2005) 
In Switzerland compliance with
animal welfare standards was lim-
ited until the major retailers selling
eggs, following pressure from con-
sumers and NGOs, announced they
would sell only eggs from cage-free
operations (Studer 2001). Swe-
den’s ban on battery cages has also
been helped by retailers’ refusal to
stock battery eggs (Agra CEAS
Consulting 2004). Major Austrian
supermarkets have volunteered to
end the sale of cage eggs by 2007
(M. Balluch, personal communica-
tion with G.M., April 14, 2006). And
in the United Kingdom, Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland, McDon-
ald’s, Europe’s largest food service
operator, uses only free-range eggs
(Pickett 2006). 
The visibility and name recogni-
tion of retailers make them sensi-
tive targets of animal welfare cam-
paigns. As retailers compete with
each other over public perception,
successfully negotiating welfare
gains with a major retailer can lead
to a “race to the top” and to a push







NGOs can work to affect both the
demand for and supply of animal
welfare. On the demand side, NGOs
can educate consumers about ani-
mal welfare. On the supply side,
NGOs can educate producers and
retailers about animal welfare;
encourage voluntary production
and retail standards; promote
research on alternative production
methods; promote subsidies for
animal welfare improvements and
challenge subsidies for animal wel-
fare abuses; and help advance and
enforce regulations governing the
treatment of animals and the sale
of animal products. These strate-
gies vary in the level of distortion
they introduce to the market. 
The least distorting strategy is to
allow producers to treat animals
however they wish and allow con-
sumers to purchase any level of ani-
mal welfare they demand. Such an
approach is likely to create a variety
of welfare levels, catering to con-
sumers who care strongly about ani-
mal welfare, those who care moder-
ately, and those who care weakly.
Such an approach is supported by
farm assurance schemes that meet
strictly enforced welfare standards
and by government regulation of
labeling. At the same time, NGOs
and governments can work to edu-
cate consumers about the value of
animal welfare, increasing demand
for higher-welfare products. 
Market distortions that now favor
abusive industries can also be dis-
mantled. For instance, feed grain
subsidies disproportionately benefit
167The Role of Economics in Achieving Welfare Gains for Animals
CAFOs that do not grow their own
feed; research and extension serv-
ices at land grant universities dispro-
portionately study and encourage
CAFO production; and CAFOs are
offered tax breaks to purchase cages
and pens. Similarly, state fish and
game commissions subsidize hunt-
ing activities, including in many
cases the purchase and provision of
“stocked” animals (e.g., fish, pheas-
ants) to provide recreational animal
use activities that are in no way con-
nected to conservation efforts. And
in the United States, the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration continues
to require the institutional use of
animals in repetitive, uninformative,
or unnecessary testing of cleaning
products, cosmetics, or medicines—
where viable nonanimal alternatives
or earlier research exists.
Because of the negative external-
ities of animal abuse, and the pub-
lic good and merit good aspects of
animal welfare, some level of mar-
ket distortion is justified. Produc-
ers and consumers could be taxed
(subsidized) at an amount equal to
the negative (positive) externality
they create. The aim of this tax
(subsidy) is to compensate society
(the producer or consumer) for the
full value of the externality. In par-
allel to the “polluter pays” princi-
ple used in environmental policy,
producers who abuse animals could
be expected to compensate society
in some way—for instance, through
taxes on less humane producers. In
parallel, humane producers could
receive a subsidy for the benefit
they provide society.
Last, governments can impose
regulations that set minimum stan-
dards of care and/or limit the pro-
duction or sale of certain products.
Throughout the world, this has
been the favored strategy for pro-
tecting the welfare of pets. In
Europe this has also been the
favored strategy for protecting the
welfare of farm animals (supple-
mented by subsidies). To a limited
extent, this is also true in the
United States, where there are
humane regulations concerning




Individuals, organizations, and soci-
eties have an unlimited number of
preferences but have only limited
resources to invest in satisfying
these preferences. To satisfy the
greatest number of preferences,
people must choose the most effi-
cient investments. Cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) is an economic tool
used to measure efficiency. Here we
discuss how CBA can help organiza-
tions prioritize projects. 
With CBA the marginal costs
and benefits of a project are meas-
ured and discounted. Marginal
costs are typically measured in dol-
lars and include any additional
expenses an organization incurs by
funding a project. Future costs are
often multiplied by a discount rate,
as costs incurred in the present
represent a greater loss for organi-
zations, which could otherwise
invest the funds. 
A project’s marginal benefit can
be measured in dollars saved or
gained (for instance, from increased
donations); and in noneconomic
measures, such as the number of
animal lives or life-years saved or
some quality-adjusted measure of
animal welfare.2 Like costs, future
benefits are often multiplied by a
discount rate, as benefits realized in
the present can be reinvested.
Net marginal cost is the differ-
ence between discounted eco-
nomic costs and discounted eco-
nomic benefits. A cost-benefit ratio
is calculated as the net marginal
cost divided by the noneconomic
marginal benefit. Projects with a
lower cost-benefit ratio are more
efficient than are projects with a
higher cost-benefit ratio and, all
other things being equal, ought to
be prioritized. 
For example, suppose an NGO
has two projects, each of which lasts
one year. Project A costs $100,000,
brings in $80,000 in donations, and
saves an estimated two thousand
animals. Project B costs $200,000,
brings in $50,000 in donations, and
saves an estimated five thousand








Project A has a lower cost-bene-
fit ratio and is thus more efficient.
All else being equal, the organiza-
tion should invest its funds in Pro-
ject A rather than Project B to save
the greater number of animals.
Moving Forward
If the objective is to do the great-
est good for the greatest number,
then animal protection NGOs (and
the donors who support them)
should invest their scarce re-
sources in projects that reduce
miser y most cost-effectively.
Because farm animals represent 99
percent of all animals raised and
killed in the United States each
year, and because there is broad
public ignorance about standard
farming practices, efforts to
improve farm animal welfare may
be especially cost-effective.
Economists and policy makers
generally prefer pull strategies
over push strategies because they
are less market-distorting. A pull
strategy educates, informs, and
promotes changes in consumer or
producer behavior. A push strategy
regulates, forces, and demands
such changes. A note of caution:
campaigns against individual pro-
ducers, or groups of producers in
individual regions, can be ineffec-
tive. If one producer is forced out
of business, another may simply
take its place, as long as the
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demand for goods remains
unchanged. 
Targeted public education cam-
paigns revealing standard animal
abuse could make substantial
progress toward improving animal
welfare. Most Americans care
deeply about animal welfare but
know little about animal abuse.
Most would be appalled to see how
animals are treated in agriculture,
research, entertainment, and
other industries. NGOs can ask
consumers to consume fewer of
those products and services that
cause animals the most misery.
This advice is consistent with the
“Three Rs” approach used in other
animal welfare campaigns: refine,
reduce, and replace (Russell and
Burch 1959). 
The low market share of welfare-
friendly products probably has
more to do with consumers’ un-
awareness of these products and
less to do with their limited avail-
ability at retail outlets. If retailers
thought there was sufficient
demand for welfare-friendly prod-
ucts, they would sell them out of
self-interest. However, retailers can
be encouraged to market actively
welfare-friendly products to con-
sumers, even in advance of signifi-
cant consumer demand. They may
be encouraged to do so to develop
a brand image as a responsible
retailer or to protect themselves
against future animal welfare cam-
paigns. Retailers—especially large
ones—have considerable influence
over production methods, are most
vulnerable to consumer pressure,
and are immune to trade agree-
ments.3 As more retailers require
audits of their suppliers, the need
for independent third-party audit-
ing and for harmonized standards
with simple, transparent labeling
will increase (Thiermann and Bab-
cock 2005).
Research Needs
Costs and Benefits 
of Animal Welfare 
To argue that animal welfare im-
provements are not economically
disastrous to producers, retailers, or
consumers, better data are needed
regarding the net economic effects
of such improvements at each level
of the market. Scant data exist on
the production costs of welfare im-
provements in the United States.
Better data are also needed on the
producer share of retail prices for
animal products to estimate the
effect of production costs on these
prices. There have been few studies
evaluating consumers’ WTP for ani-
mal welfare improvements, and even
fewer studies have measured the
actual behavior of such consumers
in price experiments. There are no
publicly available price elasticity
data on welfare-friendly products, so
it is difficult to estimate the prof-
itability of welfare improvements for
producers and retailers and the
additional costs faced by consumers.
Unfortunately, few economists are
studying these problems.
Subsidies 
To our knowledge there has been
no research on the extent to which
public subsidies for CAFOs and
other animal industries distort the
market for animal products and
decrease animal welfare. 
Externalities 
Animal industries involve hidden
costs to society. There has been no
full accounting of these costs.
Market Concentration
More research on the impact of
market consolidation in the agri-
cultural sector would aid federal
regulators considering antitrust
and other merger concerns.
Trade 
Only recently has there been some
discussion of how international
trade and trade agreements will
affect animal welfare. The problem
of substitution needs to be studied
to assess the effectiveness of state
and national legislation. 
Evaluation Research
Few animal welfare NGOs have
sought to evaluate the effective-
ness of their projects. Cost-benefit
studies can help NGOs focus their
scarce resources on those projects
that are most cost-effective in pre-
venting misery.
Social Marketing
NGOs are likely to increase the
cost-effectiveness of their programs
by using tools already employed in
market research. Increasing con-
sumers’ demand for animal welfare
can be seen as a marketing problem
similar to that faced by any com-
pany that wants to increase demand
for its products. NGOs need to
acquire better data about the low-
est-hanging fruit in society—those
consumers who can be persuaded
with the least amount of effort to
adopt more humane purchases, and
better data on how best to educate
these consumers about animal wel-
fare. One approach would be to
measure how WTP varies with the
amount of information consumers
are given about animal products. 
Resources
The reports and research tools
related to the economics of animal
welfare listed below are available
online, although they often require
users to be university affiliates or
purchase subscriptions and/or pay
per-article fees. The descriptions
below are taken from the produc-
ing organizations.
EconLit: According to the American
Economic Association, EconLit
indexes more than thirty years of
economics literature from around
the world. Compiled and abstracted
in a searchable format, EconLit, a
comprehensive index of journal arti-
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It’s in producers’ economic interests
to protect animal welfare.
As suggested by Figure 3, producers
have an incentive to maintain welfare
only at point D, the point of maximum
production efficiency. In cases where
improvements in animal welfare
decrease efficiency, efficiency usu-
ally wins. Animal morbidity and mor-
tality are costly to producers but can
be less costly than the improvements
in breeding and management needed
to reduce morbidity and mortality. As
two poultry scientists asked,
Is it more profitable to grow the
biggest bird and have increased
mortality due to heart attacks,
ascites [another illness caused
by fast growth], and leg prob-
lems, or should birds be grown
slower so that birds are smaller,
but have fewer heart, lung, and
skeletal problems? (Tabler and
Mendenhall 2003)
The researchers conclude that it
takes only “simple calculations” to
find “it is better to get the weight and
ignore the mortality” (Tabler and
Mendenhall 2003).
Rollin notes that it is: 
more economically efficient to
put a greater number of birds
into each cage, accepting lower
productivity per bird but greater
productivity per cage....[I]ndivid-
ual animals may “produce,” for
example gain weight, in part
because they are immobile, yet
suffer because of the inability to
move....Chickens are cheap,
cages are expensive. (Rollin
1995, 119)
And Mench (1992) states: 
It is now generally agreed that
good productivity and health are
not necessarily indicators of
good welfare....Productivity...is
often measured at the level of
the unit (e.g., number of eggs or
egg mass per hen-housed), and
individual animals may be in a
comparatively poor state of wel-
fare even though productivity
within the unit may be high. 
Moreover, when animals are no
longer productive—as is the case
with sick, injured, or “spent” animals
—there is no economic incentive for
producers to care for them. It’s typi-
cally cheaper to let these animals die
than it is to treat them. For instance,
99 percent of farm animals receive
no individual veterinary attention dur-
ing their lives. In the whole United
States, just 220 veterinarians are
responsible for the care of ten billion
farm animals (National Institute for
Animal Agriculture 2005).
Increasing production costs will 
hurt producers.
Producers can pass increased pro-
duction costs on to consumers in the
form of increased prices. As long as
the price elasticity of demand for a
good is greater than –1 (as it is for all
common animal foods), producers,
as a group, can maintain or increase
their revenue by raising prices. Pro-
ducers are hurt only when compet-
ing producers incur lower costs for
producing the same goods. 
Increasing production costs will 
hurt consumers.
While consumers may have to pay
more for animal-friendly products and
services, this does not “hurt” con-
sumers any more than consumers
are “hurt” by paying more for safer
automobiles. As McInerney (1991,
18) says,
Good economic sense simply
means ending up with the pat-
tern of consumption goods and
services that is preferred. It is
very little to do with spending
less money—if it were we
would all die cold, naked, and
unhappy surrounded by our
cash!
Consumers value animal welfare.
An efficient market is one in which
the aggregate WTP of consumers
equals the aggregate value of the ani-
mal welfare provided. WTP research
tells us that such a market is likely to
be one where consumers pay more
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Free-range meat and eggs are often
sold at two to three times the price
of conventional cage eggs. This has
more to do with niche marketing and
economies of scale in distribution
than with production costs. In well-
developed markets with significant
competition, prices decrease signifi-
cantly. For instance, in the United
Kingdom, where free-range eggs
enjoy a high market share, free-
range eggs often cost less than cage
eggs (Farming UK 2006). Production
costs associated with many farm
animal welfare improvements are
modest and can be offset by margin-
ally increased prices to consumers.
As long as the playing field is leveled
by regulation or adoption by pro-
ducer or retailer associations, the
effect on producers can be minimal. 
Several welfare improvements
increase production costs at the
farm level (Table l). But even signifi-
cant increases in production costs
may not significantly increase retail
prices, as farm costs typically repre-
sent less than half of the retail price
of meat or eggs. Wholesalers and
retailers add their own margins to
each product (USDA Economic
Research Service 2002). 
For instance, given the 48 per-
cent farm value share of retail price
for poultry meat (USDA Economic
Research Service 2002), a 5 percent
increase in production costs would
translate into a 2.4 percent increase
in the retail price to the consumer---
a few pennies more per pound of
chicken to alleviate the “the single
most severe, systematic example
of man’s inhumanity to another sen-
tient animal” (Webster 1994, 156).
Assuming substitutable products
were not available, increases in
price would not be expected to
decrease producers’ profits.
Demand for meat, eggs, and dairy
products is said to be “price inelas-
tic,” meaning consumers are rela-
tively unresponsive to price
changes.4 Producers as a group can
pass increased costs on to con-
sumers without a loss in profits, as
the decrease in demand is more
than compensated for by the
increase in unit price (Huang and Lin
2000). It is ultimately consumers
who bear the costs of improved ani-
mal welfare. 
Assuming constant percentage
marketing margins at the farm level
and fixed marketing margins at the
retail level, by purchasing slow-
growth chicken meat, barn eggs,
and pork from group-housed sows,
an American’s average annual food
spending would increase by only $5
(HSUS 2006). Assuming free-range
meat, eggs, and milk would
increase production costs on aver-
age by 50 percent (an overesti-
mate), purchasing only free-range
animal products would increase
average per capita food spending by
only $3 per week (Blisard 2001). 
The Economics of 
Farm Animal Production
Table 1
Costs of Welfare Improvements
Housing System Cost Increase over Standard Practice (by percentage)
Group housing (sows) 0




Furnished cages (layers) 8–28
Barn (layers) 8–24
Free-range (layers) 26–59
Sources: Theuvsen, Essmann, and Brand-Sassen (2005); Eurogroup for Animal Welfare (2005); Andreasan, 
Spickler, and Jones (2005); The HSUS (2006). 
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cles, books, book reviews, collective
volume articles, working papers,
and dissertations, is available at
libraries and on university websites
throughout the world. It is licensed
from information service providers,
which provide search engines, links
to libraries’ full-text subscriptions,
and other enhancements to assist
users in document retrieval. More
information: www.econlit.org.
AgEcon Search: A website devel-
oped and maintained at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota by Magrath
Library and the Department of
Applied Economics, AgEcon Search
collects, indexes, and electronically
distributes full-text copies of schol-
arly research in the broadly defined
field of agricultural economics,
including subdisciplines such as
agribusiness, food supply, natural
resource economics, environmen-
tal economics, policy issues, agri-
cultural trade, and economic devel-
opment. More information: http://
agecon.lib.umn.edu.
CAB Abstracts: Available prima-
rily through university libraries,
CAB Abstracts is described as the
most comprehensive source of in-
ternational research information in
agriculture and related applied life
science. Updated monthly, CAB
Abstracts provides current, in-
depth coverage of global journal
articles, academic books, abstracts,
published theses, conference pro-
ceedings, bulletins, monographs,
and technical reports. More infor-
mation: www.cabdirect.org. 
Hoovers Online: Hoovers provides
qualitative company profiles that
contain company overviews and his-
tories (private company and interna-
tional company coverage), product/
brand-name listings, competitors,
officers’ names and salaries, product
segmentation data, subsidiaries, and
financial data, including access to
annual reports and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) fil-
ings. Hoovers also profiles industries
and has an IPO watch calendar.
Financial data are available for pub-
lic companies only. More informa-
tion: www.hoovers.com.
USDA Economic Research Service
(ERS): The ERS is a primary source
of economic information and
research in the U.S. Department
of Agriculture. ERS conducts a
research program to inform public
and private decision making on eco-
nomic and policy issues involving
food, farming, natural resources, and
rural development. ERS’s econo-
mists and social scientists conduct
research, analyze food and commod-
ity markets, produce policy studies,
and develop economic and statistical
indicators. The agency’s research
program is directed at the informa-
tion needs of USDA, other public pol-
icy officials, and the research com-
munity. ERS information and
analysis is also used by the media,
trade associations, public interest
groups, and the general public. Many
datasets, reports, and analyses are
available online in real time and
updates are available via email
through free subscriptions. More in-
formation: www.ers.usda.gov.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS): The USFWS has a Hunt-
ing Statistics and Economics sec-
tion, which sponsors a National 
Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and
Wildlife-Associated Recreation every
five years. The questions are devel-
oped in concert with technical com-
mittee members from every state
and with representatives of non-
governmental organizations. The
latest survey was conducted in 2006.
More information: www.fws.gov/
hunting/huntstat.html. 
The Humane Society of the
United States: The Economic
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Dollars and Nonsense
“Officials say Denver could lose $8 million if Ringling Bros. isn't allowed to
visit the city.”
—ABC 7 News, “Opponents to ‘Circus Ban’ Bill Rally in Denver 
Initiative 100 up for Vote in August Primary,” July 14, 2004
“Voter Kim Douglas said the predicted economic impact affected her vote.
‘The state has lost so much business and revenue, and I was convinced
that this would be yet another blow,’ she said.”
—Bangor Daily News, “Bear-bait Measure 
Narrowly Rejected,” November 3, 2004
Fiscal effects include: “[P]otential sales tax revenue loss, to the extent this
bill results in fewer dog shows in California. For example, if 10 percent
fewer dogs are shown in California, there is a potential for state and local
sales tax revenue losses of more than $1 million annually.” 
—California State Assembly, Committee on Appropriations, 
Analysis of AB 418 (Koretz), April 13, 2005
“This year’s dove season will bring an additional $87 million to Michigan’s
economy.”
—National Rifle Association news release, “Michigan Dove 
Hunting Legislation Headed to Governor,” June 8, 2004 
“Pigs are their bread and butter and they must be treated humanely to be
profitable for the company.”  
—Snowflake, Arizona, Councilwoman Sharon Tate, quoted in 
“Snowflake Council Opposes Initiative Concerning 
Treatment of Female Pigs,” AZJournal.com, July 19, 2006
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Research Department maintains a
searchable database of more than a
thousand collected articles and
reports focused on animal welfare
and economics issues. Since the
department’s inception in mid-
2006, two relevant reports have
been issued (one dealing with the
economic impact issues related to
circuses in Massachusetts, the other
with mourning dove hunting in
Michigan). The Farm Animal Welfare
Department research library con-
tains a number of current analyses
of economic alternatives to specific
factory farming practices. More
information: www.hsus.org.
See also the resources described in
Chapter 1 of this volume.
Notes
1While “cruelty-free” labels clearly provide
consumers with more information on which
to base their purchasing decisions, many con-
sumers do not fully appreciate the key distinc-
tions among these labels and may inadver-
tently purchase less welfare-friendly cosmetics
products. The experience of the cosmetics-
labeling efforts suggests standardization of
definitions and regulation of terms like “cru-
elty-free” would result in even more efficient
outcomes.
2Ethical questions about animal welfare
depend on both the quality and duration of
animals’ lives. Borrowing a measure used in
the health sciences, duration can be expressed
in terms of “life-years,” equal to the number of
animal lives affected times the average life
span in years.  A life-year can also be weighted
by a perceived level of welfare. While highly
subjective, as some welfare problems are more
serious than others, estimating “quality-
adjusted life-years” can help to prioritize proj-
ects that relieve the most animal suffering. 
3In economic terms large retailers exercise
what is called monopsony power. Their large
purchasing share from the wholesale or man-
ufacturing sector makes their preferences or
requirements worth responding to. McDon-
ald’s Corporation, for example, used its
monopsony power as the number one pur-
chaser of beef in the United States to exact
animal welfare improvements at cattle slaugh-
terhouses owned or contracted by companies
wanting to continue selling beef to the fast
food giant (see, for example, McDonald’s Cor-
poration 2003).
4The price elasticity of demand is defined
as the percentage change in the quantity of a
good purchased by consumers, in response to
a 1 percent change in that good’s price. When
a good’s price elasticity is between 0 and –1,
demand is said to be inelastic with respect to
price. An increase in price of, for example, 10
percent will decrease demand less than 10
percent. This means that, in principle, the
total revenue for the seller of that good will
not decrease, as the decrease in demand is
more than compensated by the increase in
unit price. 
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